The Florida Marlins “Model”

Since 1997 only one National League East team has managed to win multiple World Series titles. That team is the Florida Marlins. Despite existing in a league that features the high spending New York Mets, the consistent Atlanta Braves, and the offensive juggernaut known as the Philadelphia Phillies, Florida has managed to remain competitive and successful.
The Florida Marlins are a remarkable story not because they win but because of how they win. The Florida Marlins operate with the knowledge of two incontrovertible facts. First, the team will not spend a tremendous amount of money in the free agent market or on payroll, period. Second, low attendance at home games does not present a financial problem due to league revenue sharing and a low payroll. Thus, it is possible to still make money as a business despite the fact that no one really wants to buy your product.
However, simply having a low payroll does not necessarily equal success. The key to the Marlins success is that the Marlins maintain the team’s low payroll by combining young players still playing out their rookie contracts and questionable veterans who are willing to play for short, minimum contracts. The inherent quality in both of these types of players is that they have the need to prove themselves. Young players know that the Marlins have no desire to pay top dollar for a valuable player, but the organization is more than willing to either flip that player for prospects or let the player leave during free agency and recoup draft picks. Thus, it is in the player’s personal interest to perform at his highest possible level to ensure continued, gainful employment as a professional baseball player. The same can be said about veteran players. Guys brought in on one or two year deals for about the league minimum know that if they want to continue playing and/or get paid more money, they have to take the opportunity given by the Marlins to show that they can produce.
For example, players such as Miguel Cabrera (traded to the Detroit Tigers, signed to 8yr/$153.5 million), Dontrelle Willis (traded to Detroit Tigers, signed for 3yr/$29 million), Josh Beckett (traded to Boston Red Sox, signed for 3yr/$30 million), Mike Lowell (traded to Boston Red Sox 3yr/$37.5 million), Cliff Floyd (traded to Expos for package of prospects including Carl Pavano), Luis Castillo (traded to Minnesota Twins, signed by New York Mets for 4yr/$25 million), Preston Wilson (traded to Colorado Rockies for Juan Pierre and Mike Hampton), and Derek Lee  (traded to Chicago Cubs, signed 5 yr/$65 million) all represent the Marlins’ plan to allow young players to develop and then trade them when they are at or near peak value. These players have then received more valuable contracts than the Marlins would have ever been willing to offer. In addition, players such as Ivan Rodriguez, Armando Benitez, and Todd Jones are examples of veterans who used their time as Marlins to procure more lucrative long-term deals.
Admittedly, the ability to continue to find successful and talented young players is vital for this type of organizational approach. However, to simply say that the Marlins have a talented scouting department dismisses the fact that when the Marlins trade talented players, they usually receive numerous prospects in return; thereby increasing the chance that at least one of those prospects will turn out to be talented. Prior to the 2002 season, the Marlins traded Matt Clement and Antonio Alfonseca to the Chicago Cubs for Julian Tavarez, Dontrelle Willis, Jose Cueto, and Ryan Jorgensen. Only Dontrelle Willis developed into an upper echelon player, albeit for a limited amount of time. Further, that same season, Cliff Floyd was traded back to the Expos for Carl Pavano, Justin Wayne, Mike Mordecai, Graeme Lloyd, Don Levinski, and Wilton Guerrero. Ryan Dempster was also traded for Juan Encarnacion and Ryan Snare. The point of this is to demonstrate that the Marlins turned 4 players into 12 players, but only two or three of those players turned out to be valuable. By trading valuable young talent at the right time, the Marlins were able to increase the quality and quantity of the talent they received in return, thus minimizing the impact of failed prospects.
This is one of the reasons that differentiate the Marlins from the Royals, Pirates, and Orioles. These organizations wring their hands when it comes to trading players away for fear of angering their fanbase. Thus, players are held onto longer and the team loses leverage when dealing with other teams. Another major reason these organizations have not found the success that the Marlins have is that they attempt to sign high priced free agents to give hope to their beleaguered fan bases. Without analyzing the moves of each organization, suffice to say that by paying someone drastically more than the rest of your team does not fuel the players desire to prove themselves, but rather creates questions like, “If they have the money to pay Player X, why am I not getting mine?” Not to mention that by allocating valuable resources of a small market team into such a limited asset the organization is prevented from investing throughout the team. Lastly, the Marlins traditionally do not trade for established talent by giving up prospects but vice versa. This way, the farm system of the Marlins is constantly infused with young players.
Now, this is not to say that the Marlins have not signed a high priced free agent, ex. Carlos Delgado, or that they will trade away every promising player. It is simply a unique organizational approach that may or may not change with the building of a new stadium and higher expectations. Thus, it should come as no surprise when the Marlins find success despite a meager payroll. Its not that the Marlins win, but how they win that makes them an organization that should be emulated by small market teams in both the National and American leagues.